The Electoral Amendment Act mandates that the Panel must “undertake a public participation process regarding the issues falling within its functions”. This chapter provides an account of the process undertaken and the findings emerging from the public consultation process. It is divided into six sections. The initial section, immediately below, is an outline of the process and the format of the deliberations. Thereafter, section two contains written inputs submitted online. Then section three reports on community meetings, followed by sections four with inputs from stakeholders, drawn from several sectors. Thereafter section five presents a summarised version of conference proceedings. The focus is on salient issues that offer lessons. Lastly, section six concludes the chapter.
Process and Format
The public consultation process entailed multiple phases over roughly eight months from 26 August 2024 to 10 April 2025. The initial invitation to the general public for online submissions was issued on 26 August 2024, through advertisements in multiple media outlets including newspapers, radio, television and social media. Promotion of the Panel’s work included newspaper articles written in English and Afrikaans.
Following the call for written submissions, the Panel moved to sectoral consultations beginning in November 2024 to April 2025. The sessions were physical and virtual. The consulted sectors included:
Civil society formations: advocacy and community-based organisations
Faith-based organisations
Political actors: political parties and independent candidates
Academics and researchers
Youth formations
Business and organised labour
Former Presidents’ foundations
South African expatriates
Traditional leaders
Most public consultations were physical, with the Panel visiting various communities throughout the country, starting on 20 January 2025 at eThekwini. The coastal city was one of the three locations in KwaZulu-Natal where the Panel held consultations. Visits to other provinces followed over a period of two months. Overall, consultations were held in 18 communities129 made up of urban and rural participants. Seven of the nine provinces had two visits, one130 had three and the other one.131
The events were organised with the support of the Department of Home Affairs and the Offices of Speakers in the various provincial legislatures. Public participation is a routine activity at provincial legislatures and they have developed effective ways of communicating their invitations using databases containing a wide range of stakeholders. Moreover, this allowed the Panel to secure public facilities at no cost. The events were hosted at community halls, municipal offices, precincts of provincial legislatures and tribal offices.
In preparation for the public engagements, the Panel published a discussion paper on 26 November 2024. The purpose was to:
explain how and why the Panel was formed
provide background to prior electoral reform initiatives
explain important electoral system concepts and their role in facilitating meaningful public participation and debate
introduce and explain the guiding principles the Panel adopted to evaluate electoral system options. These principles draw on the founding values set out in the Constitution, which the Panel felt should be reflected in the choice of an electoral system for South Africa
To encourage meaningful consultations, the Panel summarised the discussion paper into an introductory presentation used in all public consultations providing background to the Panel, an overview of the main electoral system design features relevant to the national debate and the guiding principles adopted by the Panel. The introductory presentation urged the audience to consider, in their commentary and recommendations, the following electoral system design features as the basic premise:
Different families of electoral systems: majoritarian (FPTP), PR or mixed
Size of constituencies, including the number of seats per constituency
Relative allocation of compensatory to constituency seats
Ballot structure, including open or closed list systems
Introduction of a legal threshold
Panellists were deliberate in pointing out to attendants that their reflections should draw from their experiences and that the guiding principles could be used as a starting point to identify what they want out of an electoral system. This aimed to pre-empt the audience feeling intimidated by technical, theoretical concepts in electoral systems that most people are not widely familiar with.
Where possible, a copy of the discussion paper was circulated in advance of the event. At the start of every session, a summarised version of the discussion paper was presented. Simplified translations of the discussion paper in nine official languages were also compiled and distributed at events. Proceedings were conducted in the dominant local language(s), with interpreters for both oral and sign languages present. Panellists also engaged in local languages were possible. Proceedings were recorded at most events where appropriate facilities were available to the Panel.
Public consultations ended with a conference which brought together key stakeholders, including political parties, civil society and interested parties who had provided written submissions to the Panel. The conference included international and local scholars with expertise in electoral systems. Care was taken to include scholars who had provided advice at the adoption of the initial electoral system in 1994 and who had maintained their interest by monitoring South Africa’s electoral system throughout the subsequent years. This was to ensure that the insights at the conference not only focused on contemporary issues but were also historical in perspective.
The Panel planned to conduct a public opinion survey as undertaken by the Electoral Task Team in 2002. This would form part of the public consultation process to understand how public sentiment towards the electoral system and elections has changed since 2002. The Panel prepared a survey questionnaire but the Department of Home Affairs was unable to deploy the survey before the end of our term. The questionnaire is attached as Appendix 4.
Written Submissions
Over a two-months period, September and October 2024, the Panel received 348 written submissions. A few more were received after the deadline and were accepted in the spirit of consulting as widely as possible, placing the final number at over 360 submissions. Inputs were diverse and all-encompassing. Not all addressed the question at hand. Some people commented on voting and various electoral administrative matters, while others took the opportunity to remark on the state of South African politics. While not directly related to the subject, such incidental comments were nonetheless useful as they provide insight into how the electorate feels about the electoral process and public affairs. The summary below is structured into three parts, as follows:
Electoral Reform Consultation Panel: reception and perceptions
Electoral System Experience and Commentary
Recommendations
Electoral Reform Consultation Panel: Reception and Perceptions
The inputs suggest a near-unanimous acceptance of the formation of the Panel and its mandate. Only one submission expressed scepticism about the utility of the Panel, while a few expressed concerns over the Panel’s composition. There was a lot of scepticism as the submissions held that whatever recommendations the Panel made would be ignored by political parties making the final decision. The scepticism is derived from the rejection of the recommendations made by the majority during the previous two electoral reform initiatives.
There was a counterview, however, that decried the lack of media reporting on the activities of the Panel, including a lack of visibility on social media platforms and the official website. The Parliamentary Monitoring Group was instrumental in publicising all ERCP updates, mostly after the events. The PMG platform is the most up-to-date source on ERCP information.
The rest of the submissions, through their silence on the Panel itself, appear to have taken its bona fides as a given, and/or consider their participation worthwhile. They addressed themselves strictly to the subject of the Panel and related matters.
Electoral System Experience and Commentary
The recent changes to the electoral system attracted competing views. Many submissions expressed disappointment at the poor performance of independents. Some viewed their contribution in the last election as simply adding to the fragmentation of the party system, thus creating confusion. These respondents believed that independents should be discarded together with the small parties by introducing a threshold.
Conversely, other submissions attributed the poor performance of independents to the unfairness of the system, believing that the odds were stacked against them. This included lack of funding; competing against parties; having to canvass for votes in huge province-wide constituencies and the limitation of only allowing independents to compete for 200 of the 400 National Assembly seats. In their view, the votes for independents did not count in the same way as the votes for parties.
Most submissions supported strengthening the association between voters and representatives, which was often conceived as a “constituency-based system”. Public submissions did not always provide technical explanations and did not specify whether this meant adopting smaller multi-member constituencies within the PR system or moving to a mixed-member proportional system with single-member constituencies. These submissions, however, expressed a common dissatisfaction with how the current electoral system creates a weak relationship between voters and representatives. This is derived from unhappiness with parties which they feel are unresponsive to their needs. Individual MPs, the argument goes, do not represent the electorate, but seek to please party leaders and their corporate sponsors. In their view, a “constituency-based election”, where candidates are elected directly, would enforce accountability to the electorate. A common feeling was that all government leaders, across the levels of government - i.e. mayor, premier and president – should be elected directly by voters.
A small number of submissions expressed support for a return to the pre-2024 electoral system with the view that it was ideal for enabling minority voices. A new system might eliminate small parties, which people still trust. The complaint against smaller parties, one input noted, is opportunistic. People complain about small parties only because their parties did not win as much support as they had hoped and shift the blame to smaller parties, accusing them of taking votes they should have received.
Even though some expressed support for the pre-2024 electoral system, there were also proposals for improvements. The proposals included a mechanism for recalling public representatives and for the tabling of motions of no confidence to be limited. Such motions should only be tabled if the incumbent has committed a serious offence. One view cautioned against introducing change for the sake of it. Change should only happen if the new system has been properly thought through, for each system comes with its own disadvantages.
Recommendations
The inputs offered varied recommendations determined by the person’s standpoint on the electoral system. The recommendations were as follows:
Submissions in favour of the pre-2024 electoral system, which were in the minority, propose:
eliminating constituency-based elections, and
restricting electoral participation of multiple, smaller parties.
Those in favour of bringing representatives closer to voters in a “constituency-based system”, which constitute most of the submissions, recommend:
the reduction of constituencies to the level of a metro or district municipality,
a different vote-counting formula that does not discard votes for independents,
a thorough vetting of candidates to ensure that they are of good standing,
a recall mechanism, if constituents are unhappy with their MP/MPL,
direct voting for government leaders across all levels of government, and
more representatives at the constituency level rather than national (for example, 300 constituencies and 100 national).
Community Meetings
Participants received the Panel positively. Some participants expressed appreciation that the Panel had come to their communities to seek their views. Previous electoral reviews had not embarked on such expansive public consultations. Participants generally understood what information the Panel sought from them. However, a substantial number of participants decided to use the opportunity to either complain about the Electoral Commission (IEC) or offer advice on how the Commission can improve both its electoral management and the level of voter turnout, especially among the youth. Views on voting were also triggered by a widely publicised conference on e-voting hosted by the IEC during public consultations, which was unrelated to the Panel’s activities. The bulk of inputs from community sessions were on experiences and views of the electoral system.
Although welcoming of the Panel, some participants were unsure of what would become of their views, whether Parliament would take them into consideration. The uncertainty had to do with the experiences of the two previous reviews – i.e. 2002 Van Zyl Slabbert Task Team and the 2021 Ministerial Advisory Committee (MAC). Van Zyl Slabbert’s review did not lead to any changes, while MAC did not have sufficient time to do a thorough evaluation and public consultation process. There was a concern, therefore, that the recommendations of this Panel would also be ignored. This perception comes from a general sense of scepticism, which was repeatedly expressed in the sessions, that Parliament (and government) generally does not heed people’s views.
Audiences were diverse. There were resident associations, organisations of people with disabilities, members of ward committees, youth formations, members of political parties, councillors, academics, students, religious leaders, traditional leaders and ordinary residents. It is worth noting that the presence of religious leaders and formations of people with disabilities was consistent and substantial throughout the consultations.
Comments and Proposals
Below, the report contains general comments and proposals made by participants. These are drawn from individual reports compiled on each of the 18 community sessions. The various reports are based on the notes taken by three research assistants. Some of the participants joined the sessions online.
Participants expressed a myriad of concerns about the country’s electoral system. These related to their relationship with public representatives, how parties nominate their public representatives, the number of political parties and the composition of Parliament and provincial and local legislatures. The concerns are listed and discussed below in order of priority.
Voter-public representative relationship – unresponsive and indifferent:
This was the most frequently expressed concern among participants. They feel they have a lack of influence over how public representatives perform their duties and are unable to hold them accountable. Their votes supposedly give them power over public representatives, but voters feel disempowered. They are overwhelmed by a sense of powerlessness which has culminated in popular frustration.
The electoral system, participants felt, is “party-centric” with parties enjoying “excessive power”. This not only means that parties enjoy exclusive power to decide, but also advances their interests, regardless of the adverse impact on voters. In other words, once elected, political parties develop interests of their own, which are either independent of the voters’ wishes or even hostile to them.
Lack of trust in political parties:
Stripped to its basic element, the dominant sentiment is a lack of trust in political parties. Voters do not trust politicians to make decisions in their best interests. Communities stated that they are fed up with poor governance and incompetence within the ranks of government. They also mentioned that there were arrogant and out-of-touch elected representatives who did not understand oversight and accountability.
Participants pointed to a lack of services and infrastructure as a sign of neglect and indifference. They alleged that when one of the politicians is accused of corruption, they hardly face punishment. When punishment is eventually meted out, if at all, it is the result of public pressure.
Party lists and selection criteria:
The closed party list was cited as an illustration of how parties concentrate power to themselves, and the powerlessness of voters. Party leaders get to choose who they send to Parliament. In doing so, they apply a selection criterion that does not necessarily consider merit or integrity. In the end, the public becomes saddled with representatives that are either incompetent or unethical. One participant, from Sekhing in the North West, remarked: “The voter is blinded in a closed list. It’s like a situation where you buy a goat and get home only to realise that you actually got a pig.”
What makes matters worse is that voters do not know who to approach regarding their enquiries in their communities. One participant, from Mangaung, pointed to deteriorating roads, yet people have heard that a budget was passed for infrastructure development. People do not know who to approach or complain to.
Number of political parties:
Participants decried the number of political parties in elections. What they find most disconcerting is that political parties, especially the small ones, seem to campaign on the same electoral platform. The value of those who manage to make it into Parliament with minute margins is unclear. They seem to be more concerned about financial benefits and careerism than contributing to the public good.
Participants did not see the value of smaller parties in Parliament. There is a general feeling that politics has just been monetised. “People sleep one night, wake up the next morning and decide to form a political party”, remarked one from Pietermaritzburg. People form parties not to contribute towards the public good, but to use them for financial gains.
Composition of Parliament/Legislatures:
Representation of women and people living with disabilities came up frequently as a source of disquiet. Women representation, it was noted, is relatively low, while people with disabilities are hardly represented.
Independents:
Participation of independents attracted mixed commentary. Most participants did not think their participation was necessary, especially because of their poor performance in the May 2024 election. There were participants who disagreed saying their poor performance was the result of hurdles placed in their way – i.e. massive constituencies and an unfair counting formula that favours political parties.
Proposals
Participants made several proposals. They relate to multiple issues, ranging from a preferred electoral system to party lists, nomination criteria and the number of political parties. Below we expand on each, beginning with the most cited.
Preferred Electoral System: Strengthening the Constituency Relationship
Preferences for the options of electoral systems varied, and participants did not always express their preferences in explicit electoral system terms; instead, some indicated what they wanted from an electoral system. The most widely held view was to change the system to strengthen the constituency relationship between voters and representatives.
The primary motivation behind the proposal is to strengthen and reinforce the influence of voters, specifically to shift the balance of power away from parties to the electorate. While participants did not always mention a ratio of seats, they were emphatic about directly electing their representatives.
Public views did not always express clear preferences for either single or smaller multi-member constituencies. Participants simply held that a more “constituency-based system” would reduce their dependence on parties to choose candidates on their behalf. They contended that electing representatives directly would compel public representatives to be more accountable to the voters. This accountability to the voters would, in turn, encourage public representatives to perform their duties diligently so that they could be re-elected.
Participants felt strongly about direct election as a tool to empower them vis-a-vis public representatives. Some of them even suggested that government leaders – i.e. president and premiers - should also be elected directly by voters. This would make public representatives prioritise the electorate over political parties.
To make sure that they are served optimally, some participants proposed a mid-term review to evaluate the performance of their public representative. This review mechanism, according to the proposals, will allow the voters to recall poor performing representatives and elect new individuals.
Open List Voting:
Participants were in favour of introducing open list voting to enhance their influence in selecting suitable representatives. This will give voters a greater say in parties’ selection of candidates for Parliament.
Views on open list voting reflected voters’ concerns over political parties’ tendency to change candidates after the elections and nominate new candidates who were not on the initial lists for Parliament. It is worth noting that the point here is not simply to enable voters to see the list of their potential public representatives, but to force parties to improve the calibre of their candidates. Voters want educated, morally upright and hard-working public representatives.
Equally important for the participants was that party lists should reflect diversity and inclusivity in terms of gender, disability and age. Each of these considerations adds value to Parliament and legislatures, for they serve and address different interest groups.
Threshold:
The sheer number of political parties, especially smaller ones, was a common complaint. Many participants proposed a threshold, although this point was often contentious. There was mention of an electoral threshold of 2% and 3% of electoral support, but a cap was not cited frequently. The emphasis was on managing fragmentation by reducing the number of very small parties. Participants expressed concern and questioned the smaller parties’ ability to truly represent diverse interests and effectively participate in the political process. There were views that the smallest parties were ineffective, lacking significant impact on policy or governance.
Independents:
While independents attracted mixed commentary, the dominant view was that they should be allowed to participate. The idea of individuals contesting elections, outside of parties, appealed to most participants who appear to mistrust parties. However, participants said the system was set up in a way that advantaged independents in favour of parties. Changes should be made on constituency size and in the counting formula to ensure that independents also have a fair chance of getting seats.
Sectoral Engagements
Political Actors: Parties and Independents
The Panel held two consultative sessions, with invitations to political parties and independent candidates, on 27 November and 2 December 2024. The sessions were virtual and included represented and non-represented parties in Parliament. In total 13 parties presented their views and recommendations to the Panel. In addition to the presentations, 17 political parties and independent candidates provided written submissions. These included old parties, part of government at both national and provincial levels, the official opposition and newly formed parties.
Below is a summary of the various submissions, drawing from oral presentations and detailed written submissions. The submissions vary in both length and focus. Some submissions expanded beyond the mandate of the Panel to matters related to the administration of elections, political funding and broader structural reform of the system of governance. While such matters are not entirely relevant for our purpose here, some were nonetheless noted and will be collated into a separate attachment.
Current Electoral System: Views
Most political parties and independent candidates in their written and oral submissions spoke out against the current electoral system. Themes emerging from written submissions from political parties can broadly be categorised as follows:
Accountability and the relationship between voters and representatives
Most submissions in favour of reform cited a lack of accountability and a weak relationship between voters and representatives as a core concern. In their view, the current system creates a weak link between representatives and citizens as voters cannot directly choose representatives, and that MPs are not seen as accountable to communities. This makes MPs less accountable to the public, as voters do not have the power to directly remove or vote out underperforming MPs in elections. It is parties that nominate candidates for Parliament, which incentivises MPs to prioritise the interests of party leaders to secure a re-election rather than voters.
Inclusivity and representation
Political parties and independent candidate groups commonly agreed on the importance of inclusivity in the choice of the electoral system. Most submissions emphasised the need for proportionality, and most of the reform proposals included a national compensatory list to ensure overall proportionality of the electoral system. The possibility of open list voting to allow voters to indicate support for individual candidates on party lists was also widely supported by many parties. They supported this view for varied reasons, including stronger representation and a view that it could strengthen accountability.
Fragmentation, thresholds and coalitions
The question of potentially introducing an electoral threshold was a point of contention in both oral and written submissions, with smaller parties opposed to such a threshold. Some larger parties supported the threshold, although they varied on how low such a threshold should be. Perspectives on the threshold were also tied to concerns over fragmentation of the party system and the instability of coalitions. Various proposals were put forward on strengthening the enabling framework for coalitions.
Equal opportunities for independent candidates
Supporters of independent candidates raised several concerns over how these candidates were incorporated into the current electoral system. Independent candidates complained that voters do not understand why they can vote for an independent on one ballot, but not on the other. The independent candidates also felt they bore the burden of having to explain the electoral system, while others had a simple message to convey in their canvassing votes: “vote for us on both ballots”. Independent candidates likewise argued that they needed more votes than political parties to secure a seat, and can only contest 200, out of the 400 parliamentary seats.
Supporters of independent candidates further argued that the size of the constituencies is cumbersome for independents to canvass, with provinces too vast to cover efficiently. Concerns were likewise raised over unfairness related to the filling of vacancies in Parliament. If a vacancy arises as a result of an independent passing away or resigning, no by-election is held to fill the vacancy. Instead, a party fills the vacancy.
Issues beyond the Panel’s mandate
Political funding was a common concern raised in many submissions, including concerns over a lack of transparency and the potential for corruption in political funding. Several parties additionally put forward proposals for the president, premiers and mayors to be directly elected. Other submissions suggested reforms to election management. Those proposals, however, extend beyond the mandate of the Panel.
Electoral System: Preferences
Political actors – i.e. parties and independent candidates – expressed different preferences in terms of their favoured electoral system. Unpacking preferences requires careful consideration, as proposals at times conflate technical electoral system terms.
It is often held that the debate is between PR and a “constituency-based system”, with PR usually conceived as a national party list system without any electoral districts/constituencies. In turn, “constituency-based systems” are understood by some to mean the majoritarian, First-Past-The-Post system, while others understand this to include any system with constituencies. Erroneously, some then refer to the mixed electoral system as any system with both constituencies and a party list element. An electoral system that uses multi-member constituencies (including our current system) is, however, still a PR system.132 In correct electoral system terms, a mixed system only refers to those systems that combine elements of the FPTP system (single-member constituencies) and PR.
Of the 17 submissions from political parties and independent candidate groups, the most common proposal was PR with smaller multi-member constituencies. One party expressed support for PR broadly, while questioning the value of smaller constituencies. Two parties supported a system with constituencies and a PR element without specifying the nature of the constituencies. One party supported a mixed-member proportional system (i.e. single-member constituencies and a PR compensatory component) and two unrepresented parties expressed support for “constituencies” that could be understood in terms of a FPTP system. Four parties did not specify a preference.
Proposals for Reform
Proponents of reform for a greater constituency element to the electoral system attribute their preference to two underlying reasons:
The passage of time, the argument goes, has rendered the initial electoral system without a substantive constituency element outdated. Accountability and the decline in electoral participation have emerged as the two most pressing challenges that require attention. Parties, it is noted, cannot hold their leaders accountable. Party leaders enjoy carte blanche because they compile their parties’ lists for Parliament. Members of Parliament, therefore, are indebted to party leaders. The consequences of a lack of accountability, especially in instances where the leader of the party also happens to be the president of the country, have been damaging not only in terms of abuse of power but also in citizen-state relations.
The citizenry-state relations have been characterised by, among others, disengagement. Electoral participation has been declining over the last few elections. The 2024 general elections, for instance, registered a 58% turnout, a drop from 66% in 2019. The picture gets worse when turnout is compared to the overall number of eligible voters in the country, with a large decline in voter registration rates. Proponents of reform blame the declining rate of electoral participation on disillusionment. Voters feel their votes do not make a difference. MPs, the argument goes, are indifferent to the needs of voters, making the electorate feel powerless. While there are supposed to be constituency offices, with each MP attached to one throughout the country, voters neither know their MPs, nor the location of their constituency offices.
The following proposals were made:
Ratio of seats: Most submissions did not express explicit proposals for the ratio between constituency and compensatory seats. Among submissions that considered the relative allocation of seats, the most common proposal was 300 constituency seats and 100 for compensatory seats.
Constituency size: Among proponents of the PR system with smaller constituencies, demarcation of constituencies would follow municipal district and metro boundaries. Each constituency should have multiple seats, with the exact number determined by population size. While there was a preference for fixed (geographic) boundaries, there was also recognition that population size fluctuates over time, which may necessitate a redrawing of boundaries. This could be done on a five-year interval. Proponents of a mixed system did not specify an approach to the demarcation of single-member constituencies.
Ballot structure: Most submissions preferred an open ballot to allow voters to rank candidates in order of preference with only one political party expressing a preference for closed lists. Proponents of direct elections believe that voters will gain direct influence over MPs. Knowing that their re-election depends on voters, MPs will be more inclined to work in a manner geared to please their constituents. Moreover, voters will know how to contact their representatives to resolve their problems.
Direct elections: The proposal on direct voting goes beyond MPs. Several of those who favour reforms propose direct elections of heads of government. Some say it should be limited only to the president, while others recommend that this system be applied across the board to include premiers and mayors.
Recall mechanism: To enhance accountability, another proposal is made for a recall mechanism. The contention is that, in instances where an MP or a government leader proves to be inept, voters should be able to remove him/her from office.
These proposals were not without opponents. Their opposition is largely targeted at the constituency aspect (of the system), which they contend:
Limits diversity and range of representation: They contend that South Africa remains a patriarchal and diverse society, characterised by numerous minorities and vulnerable groupings. Women and LGBTQ communities, for example, may be overlooked for representation due to prejudice. Left to their own devices, the electorate would not easily elect vulnerable groups to public office.
Does not guarantee accountability and effective representation: Constituencies are made of diverse and multiple interest groups which makes consensus or unanimity on any single issue impossible. The experience of local government is cited to refute the assertion that constituency elections foster accountability of public representatives. Ward councillors, the argument goes, are notorious for a lack of accountability. There’s no certainty, therefore, that MPs/MPLs elected on a similar basis will be accountable.
An electoral system, the argument goes, has little to do with encouraging accountability. Rather, accountability is a ‘post-election’ issue that rests with Parliament and political parties. Both these entities must have a mechanism that fosters accountability of MPs to their constituencies. Lastly, contrary to what is commonly asserted, constituents do not have full control over the nomination of MPs. Political parties will still exercise some sway in the nomination of candidates.
Creates an administrative and a financial burden: Constituency boundaries would have to be constantly redrawn to cater for population changes.
Submissions in favour of the current system
One political party expressed support for the virtues of the current system and PR more broadly. They cite the following reasons for their proposal:
Simplicity and familiarity: It is simple to understand how the system works. The fact that it was used for all the elections, except in 2024, made it even easier for voters because of their familiarity with the system.
Equality of votes: All votes count equally, none is discarded.
Exclusivity and representation: Because each vote counts, there’s maximum representation of political parties in Parliament. This is critical in a society like South Africa, which is still divided along racial lines.
Equally important, the PR system allows for the representation of vulnerable groups in society through inclusion in the list of parties. For a society that still suffers from prejudice against women and the LGBTQ community, the party lists ensure an inclusive and representative Parliament.
Majoritarian system
Only two unrepresented parties supported a strictly constituency-based, majoritarian system. In their view, the nomination of candidates should be left to constituents, and the executive should be directly elected.
Submissions from the vast majority of political parties and public consultations were overwhelmingly opposed to the introduction of a majoritarian system. Opponents contend that the system favours big parties. In a country like South Africa, which is still characterised by social and racial divisions, the exclusion of small parties is counterproductive. It works against social cohesion.
Researchers, Civil Society Organisation and Activists
Current Electoral System: Views
A limited number of the submissions supported the retention of the current electoral model. While introduced as a reform measure on the previous model, to widen inclusion with the introduction of independent candidates, it is not seen as an improvement. One submission remarked that it made a mockery of the commitment to inclusion. This was because the modality of the system was not configured in a way that enabled independents to succeed (as noted below).
Instead, numerous inputs noted that the odds were stacked against independents succeeding. Independents encountered the following hurdles:
Competed against parties, instead of another candidate: this meant that independents were not measured against another individual. Alongside their face on the ballot paper was a party name and logo. A party candidate was possibly helped by the brand of the party.
Contested half of the seats: they could only contest for 200 seats, for instance, and were restricted to three regions.
If an independent won more than one seat, they could only assume one and would have to forfeit the other.
Even before the 2024 reforms, it was noted, the system already had several flaws. These included:
Lack of accountability: government leaders are not held responsible for their actions. This is because MPs are beholden to government leaders, who happen to be party leaders responsible for their election through a party list. The net effect has been a weak Parliament in relation to the executive.
Poor calibre of public representatives: because of the closed party list system, the electorate does not choose candidates for Parliament. Instead, the party makes the selection. This method of selection does not guarantee the nomination of the best candidate, for merit is not always the first consideration.
Disconnected citizens: voters have no control over MPs. There are no incentives for MPs to be responsive to the electorate. Their initial election and re-election depend largely on the party, not on the electorate.
Apathy and disengagement: without influence over public representatives, the electorate feel that their votes do not matter. They disengage from the electoral process, which explains the declining levels of electoral participation.
Distrust in politicians and public institutions: because of a lack of accountability, the electorate has lost trust in both politicians, and public institutions.
Preferences
Submissions133 favoured a variety of electoral systems with proposals including both broad preferences (for example, a combination of constituencies and PR without specifying the nature of constituencies) and detailed proposals expressed in technical terms. Proposals broadly fall into four categories as shown in Figure 9:
PR systems ranging from a return to the 2019 system, to proposals to reduce the size of multi-member constituencies (blue).
Mixed-member proportional systems including a proposal for a two-round system in single-member constituencies (yellow).
“Constituency-based” systems with PR compensation including proposals supporting reforms to either a mixed-member proportional system or introducing smaller multi-member constituencies in PR (green). Some proposals expressed support for either system, other proposals expressed support for the broad concept without defining the nature of constituencies.
A limited number expressed support for entirely constituency-based systems without compensation or party lists (red).
The most common theme among proposals was to strengthen the constituency element of the electoral system while maintaining a PR component to ensure proportionality of the system. Their choice of system, one submission pointed out, should not suggest that they believe it will eliminate all of South Africa’s socio-economic ills. No electoral system is perfect, they pointed out. In their view, this would, however, offer something that approximates perfection. Another submission, along the same lines, added that opting for a stronger constituency element to the system is not a rejection of PR, which has been in use for the most part of the last 30 years.
Both submissions were cognizant that the proportional representation system promotes qualities, such as diversity and inclusiveness that South Africa cherishes. But, as the submissions pointed out, changing electoral systems involves trade-offs. While there may be many guiding principles, accountability was a serious concern, and in some cases, participants believed that it should be rated higher. MPs should be held responsible for their performance, and the electorate must have a way of registering their discontent with their MPs.
In their view, the current system has created an accountability deficit and weakened MPs in relation to the party hierarchy. Constituency offices have not worked. People do not know who their public representatives are, and where the offices are located. At the root of the problem is that MPs do not have an incentive to be attentive to their duties to voters. This could change if they are elected directly by voters within a particular constituency where they reside.
In other words, the reasons for supporting reforms to the system are as follows:
Stronger Parliament: Parliament has been weak so far, partly because MPs are not elected directly by voters, but are chosen by the party. This manner of election, through a party list, makes them beholden to the party. However, if at least half the MPs are elected through constituency, there is more incentive to be responsive to the constituents.
Similarly, Parliament will be emboldened to exercise oversight over the executive. But, as one submission cautioned, there should also be anticipation of a backlash from parties, especially where MPs defy parties as they prioritise the concerns of their constituents. This is something that should be pre-empted.
Improve the calibre of candidates: Having members elected in the constituency will support the election of candidates of a good calibre. Electorate will most likely, in their preference for leaders, insist on demonstrable public service and good character. Individuals with such profiles would receive preference. Once elected, the MPs will also try hard to remain attentive to their duties to gain re-election
MPs vs Parties: It does not mean that MPs would not be forced to follow party discipline, even if such decisions are against the interests of constituents. Such tensions will arise, but it is highly likely that MPs won’t support decisions that disadvantage their constituents.
Presidential election: This allows for the possibility of electing a president directly. This will enhance accountability even further. The president will not be indebted to the party but will be answerable directly to the electorate.
Recall mechanism: Where a public representative fails to fulfil his or her mandate, it would be possible to recall that individual and have a by-election. This will ensure that the electorate has immediate recourse, instead of enduring an incompetent public representative until the next election. This will also incentivise public representatives to be diligent in their duties.
As part of promoting interaction between constituents and public representatives, a proposal was made to legislate public meetings. This will make sure that meetings are held regularly.
Seats and ballot design
Not all submissions commented on how many seats each constituency should have. Some favoured single-member constituencies demarcated along municipal lines. Others favoured smaller multi-member constituencies in a PR system. There were also different views on the division between compensatory and constituency seats. Among those that remarked on the division of seats, the most common proposal was 300 constituency seats and 100 from a compensatory list; others proposed 250 from constituencies, and 150 from a compensatory list. There was unanimity, that the PR ballot should be based on an open list.
Threshold
The question of a threshold was mentioned less frequently by this group of stakeholders. Two submissions came out in favour of imposing the threshold. One was not specific on the threshold, and the other proposed 1%. The purpose, it was noted, is to maximise prospects of stability. While this would disqualify several parties, Parliament would remain broadly representative of the largest portion of the electorate.
The proposal on the threshold extended to the formation of the government, which seems likely to remain as a coalition. Here, it was proposed, only parties with 10% of the seats should be considered for inclusion in the coalition government, and the largest party should be allowed to elect the president and premier.
Supporting Mechanism
Because coalitions are likely to be an enduring feature, it was also proposed that other measures be introduced to strengthen them. These were:
Limiting the number of motions to once a quarter, and be supported by at least 10% of public representatives in Parliament and legislatures
Extending the coalition formation period to between 30 and 60 days
iii. Formalising coalition agreements and making them public
Youth Formations
The most attended of all the virtual consultations, held on 14 March 2025, was the session with youth. It drew a variety of formations.134 The discussions revolved around a lack of accountability in the current system, which led to young people disengaging with the political process and feeling that their vote would not count. This was attributed to the closed list system, which reserves the nomination of public representatives to parties. In their view, this also meant that representatives were beholden to party leaders rather than voters.
The dominant proposal was that the electorate should be allowed some influence in the selection of candidates. This should be done through an open list system or by introducing a mixed electoral system so that voters can hold individual representatives accountable. Others proposed a direct election of government leaders – i.e. president and premier.
Voters Abroad
South Africans abroad made both written submissions and oral inputs in a virtual session. They emphasised that South Africans living abroad still maintained an interest in the country’s success and, in many cases, only lived abroad temporarily for work. Their most common concern was around the accessibility of voting, with limited voting stations making it difficult to vote.
Under the current system, voters abroad only receive the national ballot and therefore cannot vote for independent candidates (who can only contest the regional ballot) or vote for provincial legislatures. This means that their vote is half the value of ordinary voters in the National Assembly, as the calculation of compensatory seats is based on the combined total of the regional and national ballots. Participants likewise questioned why they were not allowed to vote for provincial legislatures and suggested that their last voter registration address in South Africa could be used to determine which province they should be allowed to vote for on both the regional and provincial ballots.
Another concern was around their representation in the National Assembly, with some proposing a constituency specific to voters abroad to represent their views and hold foreign missions accountable for the services they provide to South Africans abroad. Another proposal included securing representation in the National Council of Provinces (NCOP), with a proposal that they be considered as the 10th province, allocated one delegate to the NCOP.
Business and Labour
Two sessions were held with labour135 and business. One combined labour and business, and the other was held separately with the Solidarity Movement. The two sectors raised concerns about accountability and stability. The latter concern stems from the flourishing of coalitions at the local government level, which have been characterised by instability. They blame the instability on the presence of multiple small parties. These parties, they argue, are opportunistic and tend to encourage a frequent change of coalitions as they pursue their own material interests.
Both labour and business were unanimous in their concern over a lack of accountability in the current system, with proposals including a mixed system, introducing constituencies in PR and adopting an open list system. The constituency-based aspect, they elaborate, will ensure that the electorate directly elect their representatives. The also want to know the list of party candidates. In addition, they recommended a threshold to limit the number of parties in Parliament.
Traditional Leaders
The Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (CONTRALESA) submitted a comprehensive proposal advocating for an electoral system that enhances participatory democracy, accountability and inclusivity in South Africa’s governance structures. Key proposals include:
Electoral Model: A system where 50% of Members of Parliament (MPs) and Provincial Legislators are elected directly, with the remaining 50% constituted by political party representatives.
Direct Election of Executives: Citizens should directly elect the president, premiers, and mayors. Upon election, these officials must resign from any party-political positions to ensure impartial governance.
Reform of Executive Appointments: The president and premiers should appoint cabinet members based on merit, including individuals from outside the legislature. Appointees must resign from legislative and party roles to uphold the separation of powers doctrine.
Enhanced Role for Traditional Leaders: Four seats in each provincial legislature and 10 seats in the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) should be reserved for traditional leaders, recognising their constitutional role and promoting community-based governance.
NCOP Reform:In addition to traditional leaders, 10 representatives from the South African Local Government Association (SALGA) should be included, with 60 members continuing to be elected via proportional representation.
Motivation: The reforms are rooted in the need to address accountability failures in the current party-centric system and respond to the 2020 Constitutional Court ruling mandating independent candidate participation.
Conference Proceedings
The Panel held a conference on 9-10 April 2025 bringing together key stakeholders to discuss the Panel’s initial findings emerging from public consultations. There were 11 presentations made over the days. These included presentations by members of the Panel on what came out of the public participation process, the principles of electoral design and preliminary system options emerging from public consultation. Perhaps more important were insights provided by international scholars on experiences elsewhere, with a view to providing lessons for South Africa. Below are summaries of the various presentations. The focus is exclusively on the presentations made by non-panel members and draws out salient issues.
Electoral Reforms in Multi-Tiered Systems: Denmark, Lesotho and, of course, South Africa. Jorgen Elklit, Professor Emeritus, Aarhus University, Denmark
The presentation examined two-tiered electoral systems, including Denmark, Lesotho, and South Africa as case studies. While Lesotho makes use of single-member constituencies and Denmark and South Africa use multi-member constituencies, all three countries include a compensatory tier to ensure the overall proportionality of electoral results.
A key difference between South Africa and Denmark’s system is their use of a legal threshold for compensatory seats to prevent fragmentation, and the use of preferential voting on party lists, which allows voters to hold MPs seeking re-election accountable. An alternative to introducing a threshold in South Africa could be to raise the ballot access requirements. In Denmark, the required number of signatures is the full quota for a seat in the previous election, whereas in South Africa it is only 15% of the quota, which is overly generous and explains why so many minor parties get on ballot papers.
Regarding the question of electoral reform, Elklit indicated that while South Africa’s system has many qualities, there’s room for improvement. In his view, accountability remained a key concern. While accountability can best be achieved with single-member constituencies, doing so comes with challenges, including the large demarcation exercise that would be required. Instead, the lower level could be made up of smaller multi-member constituencies than the current regions, including “about 70 MMCs with an average magnitude of 4.5 seats would give 315 MMC seats and 85 compensatory seats. That would certainly be enough to secure an adequate level of proportionality.” South Africa’s Electoral System: Principles and Considerations. Andrew Reynolds, Professor Emeritus, Princeton University, USA
Andrew Reynolds moved from the premise that South Africa is still a divided society. And so, whatever new system is formulated, it shouldn’t exacerbate conflict, promote dominant and homogenous parties. Given the current concerns, the system should certainly encourage accountability and a stable government.
Arising from the above, Reynolds provided the following counsel. Incremental changes are advisable. If the current system does not work optimally, it is better to tweak the system rather than jettison it. Given changes over time, reforms become necessary to make institutions more appropriate for the modern era, and this requires trade-offs among the various elements. Not all elements of the electoral design are equally important. Elements that enable the overall, optimal impact on the current concern about accountability should be given priority, and voters need to own the system, not politicians.
Smaller constituencies, with multiple seats, and an imposed threshold could strengthen the current system without losing some of its best elements. An open list and a ballot design that has the names of the candidates could be introduced. Some could have both pictures and names of candidates, and others have names only.
Open List Proportional Representation (OLPR). Alan Wall, electoral administration and democracy advisor based in Australia
There are multiple variations of Open List Proportional Representation (OLPR): Pure, Flexible, and Protected lists. Each offers a different option. Candidates can either be elected purely on the number of votes; a threshold may be required for a candidate to move up the list in the allocation of seats; or the party may protect some candidate, usually the head of the list, exempted from competition on their party list.
Many recent electoral reforms have been marked by a shift from closed to open list systems. The shift has been prompted by an increasing call for accountability and to improve the calibre of public representatives. Voters are showing interest in voting for individuals, rather than parties, based on their personal attributes and reputation.
While OLPR has advantages, there are also risks to consider. OLPR may be less inclusive, especially on gender, as voters choose individuals. Patriarchal beliefs may discourage some voters from voting for women. Internal party competition may also promote the practice of bribery to influence how party members vote. Ballot design is a key issue to get right. If the ballot paper is likely to be unwieldy, it can create confusion among voters and has the potential to increase the number of spoilt ballots.
Electoral System Reform: SADC Region. Khabele Matlosa, Strategic Institute for Research & Dialogue, Maseru, Lesotho.
Most countries in the region follow the FPTP system, with the PR system being the second most popular. Only one country has moved to a mixed system, but three countries started reforms towards a mixed system, which have stalled due to a lack of political commitment. Noteworthy about the countries that follow a PR system is that they went through violent conflict. Their adoption of PR was part of consolidating their peaceful settlement.
Matlosa pointed out that a mixed system, much the same way as PR, promotes party fragmentation. This raises the possibility of coalitions, and, by implication, instability such as seen in Lesotho, and this demands robust mechanisms to ensure stability. Reforms only work if accompanied by a concomitant change in mindset. Politicians must readjust their thinking to align with the requirements of the new system. In South Africa, coalitions are already prominent and are likely to remain a lasting feature. But, it does not look like politicians are willing to make coalitions work for the public, especially at a local level.
Meaningful electoral reform, Matlosa went on to add, ought to bring citizens to the centre of the democratic discourse, and electoral reform should be complemented by wider democratic reforms, including political, economic, and institutional transformation. The declining rates of voter registration and turnout, for instance, are indicators of the eroding trust in institutions. For the reforms to fully realise their objective, they can’t simply be limited to mechanical changes. It also requires political leaders to dedicate themselves to democratic principles. This means expanding public participation and reducing elite dominance. The populace must feel a sense of control, or ownership, over political life.
Electoral Systems and Party System Effects. Fernando Casal Bértoa, Associate Professor, University of Nottingham, UK
The paper examines the effect not only of each category of systems, but the variations within each category on the political system. This involves the impact on gender equality, representation and internal party cohesion. Some of the variations may be too complex for South Africa. Of particular importance, though, is how constituency sizes and the number of seats (whether single or multiple) impact on proportionality, and designing an electoral system involves trade-offs, such as the following:
Proportionality v Governability: Higher proportionality enhances representation but may reduce governmental stability due to coalition complexities.
Representation v. Simplicity: Systems like Single Transferable Vote or Mixed Member Proportional representation increase voter choice and fairness but are harder for the public to understand and administer.
Inclusivity vs Fragmentation: While proportional systems include more political voices, they may lead to fragmented party systems and unstable cabinets.
An effective system requires finding the right balance between trade-offs.
Country Case: Germany – Election of the Bundestag. Axel Bayer, First Secretary: Political Affairs, German Embassy in South Africa
The current system of personalised proportional representation is a variant of mixed-member proportional representation, including a first vote for candidates in single-member constituencies and a second proportional vote. This allows for localised representation as well as overall proportionality. The Bundestag is made up of a maximum of 630 seats allocated in proportion to the number of second votes.
Based on the number of first votes received, a successful constituency candidate moves to the top of the party’s list of candidates in the particular federal state. This means they are the first to be considered in the allocation of seats. However, if a constituency candidate’s ranking on this list is not matched by the number of seats the party would receive based on second votes, the constituency mandate is not awarded.
While diversity is valued, fragmentation should be limited. Fragmentation leads to instability, which makes a government somewhat dysfunctional. Germany’s answer to fragmentation and the resultant unstable coalitions is an imposed threshold of 5% to gain representation in the legislature and reflects past challenges with political instability that led to the rise of Nazism.
Indonesia’s Electoral System Reforms. Adhy Aman, Senior Programme Manager, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
Indonesia is a lesson on how contested electoral reforms can be. Though prompted by the need for accountability and to assert more voters’ control over public representatives, the process did not unfold seamlessly. The political elite resisted the shift, leading to the process being stalled and producing half-measures. The system continued to be changed over five electoral cycles. One example of half-measures, or the pretext of change, was the introduction of a half-open list system. While giving the appearance of being open, where voters could choose their candidates, the party still retained enormous influence on who was elected. In some cases, individuals who received the highest number of votes were not elected, as party leaders had the final say.
In the long term, the electorate does not surrender if reforms fail to address their concerns. As a result, the system continues to be improved. With the move to a full open list system, competition among candidates has improved the calibre of candidacies and a healthy rate of non-performing incumbents not being re-elected.
There’s a concern that contests among candidates have triggered the practice of vote buying. Party supporters are bribed to nominate a particular individual. Although frowned upon, this vice is not unique to an open list system and exists under closed list systems as well.
Perhaps a more genuine concern is the rise of spoilt ballot papers. This was caused most likely by the shift to a new ballot paper design. A great deal of care and education is required both in the design and for voters to know how to express their intent on the ballot. Gender activists have expressed a concern that an open list system works against women’s representation, and a way must be found to ensure that popular prejudices against women do not limit their representation.
General Comments and Conference Discussion
Political Parties and Racial Identity: There’s a rise in parties formed along racial identities. This increases polarisation and is something the new electoral system should investigate.
Coalitions: The many parties that South Africa has, and the lack of outright winners, have led to coalitions. Coalition governments are unstable in most cases. Legislation should be introduced to regulate and manage their formation and functioning.
Threshold: Views varied on whether an imposed threshold is required to limit the number of parties in order to address the problem of unstable coalitions. One view supported the introduction of a formal threshold, while others argued it should not be imposed, but that parties should be restricted at the registration level. The number of signatures required should be increased and e-signatures should also be considered. Among those who opposed a formal threshold was the view that it would be unconstitutional, as it would bar parties from representation when they’ve received votes for such.
Electoral System Options: Different views were expressed on the options presented by the Panel. There was disappointment that Option 1 was considered, as this implies a retention of the status quo, which has elicited widespread discontent. A call was made to be mindful that the greatest source of unhappiness with South Africa’s political life stemmed from the lack of accountability and disconnectedness between voters and public representatives. A new electoral system, therefore, should be a remedy to this public unhappiness. This should involve smaller constituencies and a bias towards more constituency seats in the composition of legislatures.
There was also a concern raised about the Panel submitting multiple options without a clear preference. The suggestion was that the Panel should propose three options but make a recommendation of one.
Accountability and Recall: Non-performing public representatives should be recalled. Care should be taken, however, to make sure that party leaders do not abuse this mechanism to settle their own scores against public representatives. Efforts must be made to involve constituents in the recall process.
Conclusion
The public consultation process was extensive. The Panel covered the length and breadth of the country. Many sectors of South African life participated, and participants were multi-generational and drawn across races. The common complaints, or concerns, about the electoral system were:
Lack of a relationship between voters and public representatives: there’s no connection, and, as a result, public representatives are not accountable to voters.
Voters distrust political parties: participants feel that politicians do not prioritise their needs, but their own interests, and look out for each other, even at the detriment of the public.
Poor calibre of public representatives: parties do not prioritise merit in their selection process and appear to value loyalty above everything else.
Party fragmentation: there are too many small parties, something that has already made local government unstable.
Flowing from the concerns, the dominant proposals are as follows:
Electoral System: a combination of constituency-based and proportional representation models. Proposal on the division of seats between constituencies and PR vary: 200: 200; and 300 constituencies and 100 PR.
Constituency Size and Number of Seats: the size of the constituency should be relatively small – i.e. municipal or district size – to enable the electorate to know and form a close relationship with their public representative. Most parties felt that constituencies should have multiple seats.
Presidential/Premier Elections: direct elections for president and premiers should be considered. The purpose is to ensure they account directly to voters, not to their parties.
Open Party Lists: many submissions from political parties, CSOs, and the public supported the idea of open lists, allowing voters to express preferences for individual candidates on party lists.
Recall: public representatives should be recalled if they fail to perform their duties. Voters shouldn’t have to wait for the next round of elections to remove an incompetent public representative.
Threshold: a legal threshold to limit the number of small parties. Having fewer parties minimises the prospects of unstable coalitions.
The consultation process was relatively extensive, particularly given the resources and time available, and included a variety of opportunities for comment and opinion to be provided. The issues raised above have been considered by the Panel in arriving at the options recommended in Chapter 6.
Notes
- Places that were visited per province as follows: Eastern Cape: Gqeberha (formerly Port Elizabeth) and EmaXesibe (previously Mt Ayliff); Free State: Mangaung and Phuthaditjhaba; Gauteng: Johannesburg; KwaZulu-Natal: eThekwini, Pietermaritzburg and uLundi; Limpopo: Polokwane and Giyani; Northern Cape: Kimberly and Heuningvlei, Tseo Village; North West: Rustenburg and Sekhing, Ba ga Mothibi Village; Mpumalanga: Mbombela and Middelburg; and Western Cape: Cape Town and George. Back to text
- KwaZulu-Natal: the population is spread widely over a large landscape. Back to text
- Gauteng: the province is fully urbanized, and Johannesburg, where the event was held, is easily accessible from any part of the province. Back to text
- Only seven of the more than 80 PR systems worldwide do not include any constituencies/electoral districts and only have one national PR list. This includes Armenia, Fiji, Israel, the Netherlands, Serbia, Slovakia and Timor-Leste. Back to text
- This applies strictly to the CSOs, academics, think-tanks, researchers, and activists. Back to text
- They included Operation Dudula, Independents, Moral Regeneration Movement, former junior mayor of Midvaal, Golden Youth Club, De Klerk Foundation, youth representatives from political parties etc. Back to text
- Cosatu was part of the public meeting that was held in Cape Town with academics, researchers and activists. Their views have been included here, with the rest of the labour movement. Back to text